Monday, June 09, 2003

Claimant Can Not Extinguish Former Counsel's 20% Fee When Compromising and Releasing Future Benefits

In Gingerich v. WCAB (US Filter) a continuing 20% attorney's fee was awarded on the grant of a fatal claim. When the Widow entered into a compromise and release waiving future benefits in consideration of wavier of the subrogation lien, The WCJ approved the Agreement and terminated the attorney fee and the Board affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held that even though the Claimant exercised her Section 449(a) right to compromise any and all liability under the Act, she did not have the right to extinguish the 20% counsel fee.

The result in this case might be explained by the answer to the question: "If the Attorney's fee is owed, who pays?" The Claimant is contractually bound to pay the fee. However, in the Compromise and Release Agreement in this case the Defendant agreed that it would pay the fee if it was found that the fee is owed.

Suspension May Be Appropriate If Overtime Is Not Available For Economic Reasons

In M. Capper v. WCAB (ABF Freight Systems, Inc.) the Claimant pressed the issues of reasonable contest where: 1) The Claimant returned to work full time, full duties, but with a wage loss due to lack of overtime (Employer sought suspension); and 2) the Employer initially contested thirty to forty mile trip expenses to obtain medical treatment in eastern Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth Court held there was a reasonable contest on both issues. Importantly, the Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Harle and stated the Claimant may not be entitled to a partial if overtime was no longer available for economic reasons.

No Supersedeas Reimbursement for Grant of Section 306 (f.1)(8) Suspension

The Employer in Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. WCAB (Exel Logistics) sought supersedeas reimbursement when a supersedeas was denied, and the WCJ later granted suspension for refusal of reasonable medical treatment. The Commonwealth Court analyzed Section 443, and concluded supersedeas reimbursement is for change of status under Section 413 cases, and there is no such remedy in a section 306(f.1)(8) case.

The dissent suggested a common sense approach would not distinguish a Section 306(f.1)(8) forfeiture from a suspension that can be sought under Section 413. After all, the Court stated in Stuart Painting v. W.C.A.B. (Asvestas) 611 A.2d 787 (Pa. Commw. 1992) that the relief under Section 306(f.1)(8) is a suspension rather than a forfeiture.

Saturday, June 07, 2003

Rating Lowered for Princeton Insurance

Insurance Journal reported Standard and Poor's lowered Princeton's rating to Bpi and the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance is considering placing Princeton under supervision. Article

Thursday, June 05, 2003

OSHA Draft Ergonomic Guidelines for Poultry Processing

OSHA issued Draft Ergonomic Guidelines for Poultry Procesing, the third set of industry-specific guidelines. Article

Annals of Internal Medicine Compares Treatments for Low Back Pain

The Annals of Internal Medicine published a study indicating spinal manipulation therapy was no more or less effective than other therapies in the management of low back pain. Article

Case Emphasizes the Importance of Coordinating Workers' Comp and Personnel Administration

Dept. of Corrections v. WCAB (Clark) is a case in which the collective bargaining agreement required the Claimant to pay back WC benefits when he had used sick time. The case was settled with a Compromise and Release providing that the Claimant would collect about $2,000.00. When the personnel office recovered the amount from the Claimant's pay, the WCJ rather perfunctorily directed payment of the C&R amount with no credit pursuant to the CBA. The WCJ also granted the Claimant's request for 50% penalties and attorney's fees for unreasonable contest. The Compromise and Release Agreement did not reflect that the Claimant was required to reimburse the Employer, and apparently it did not come up at the hearing. The Board and the Court affirmed.

Credibility Determination Paramount in Disposition of URO

In R. Jackson v. WCAB (Boeing) the treating chiropractor's care was found not reasonable and necessary. The Court held: 1) the WCJ did not shift the burden of proof to the Claimant when the WCJ noted the treating chiropractor failed to respond to the reviewer's points; 2) the fact that the treating chiropractor offered treatment to alleviate pain did not overcome the WCJ's finding that the reviewer was more credible; and 3) even though the UR was requested late, e.g. more than thirty days after the billing was submitted, the request for prospective review was timely.

Study Suggests Prompt MRI Leads to Unnecessary Surgery

A study of oucomes of prompt administration of plain x-ray vs. MRI determined that people who had the MRI did not necessarily have better outcomes of treatment. There was a correlation between the MRI and surgery, and the study suggested the MRI pathology may not have correlated with the patient's symptoms, yet surgery was still performed on the MRI findings.

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Supreme Court Sends Issue of Change of Status of Illegal Aliens Back to Commonwealth Court

DDP Contracting, Inc. & Penn National Ins. v. WCAB (Mora) presents the issue unresolved by The Reinforced Earth Co. v. WCAB (Astudillo), i.e. what is the Employer's burden to suspend or modify benefits awarded to an illegal alien?

In Reinforced Earth, the case was remanded to the WCJ to make a record on the Employer's request that benefits be suspended. The Court held a suspension will not be granted on the sole basis that an illegal alien can't be employed, but this does relieve the Employer from showing job availability. The Court discussed earning power as a basis for change of status, but in a footnote stated it did not endorse the Commonwealth Court's suggestion that an Act 57 analysis be undertaken. One possible outcome could be that a credible medical opinion that the Claimant could return to work would suspend benefits.

However, in the present case this outcome is not easy to arrive at. The WCJ has credited a medical opinion that the Claimant is unable to return to work as a roofer. Another fact is that the Claimant found new work at a reduced wage. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Reinforced Earth post-dated the Commonwealth Court's decision in DDP Contracting the Supreme Court exercised its perogative to see what the Commonwealth Court can make of the facts of DDP Contracting. In the meantime, the Employer's burden to show a change of status remains anywhere between a medical release and job availability.

Friday, May 23, 2003

New Jersey Supreme Court Allows Claim for PTSD Filed Six Years After Date of Injury

In Diana G. Brunell v. Wildwood Crest Police Department and Samuel Stango v. Lower Township Police Department (A-126/127-2001) the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder can be considered an occupational disease, following decisions of courts in Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. Accordingly, the Claimants could file within two years of discovery of their compensable injury.

Commonwealth Court distinguishes Chavis in Case Where Claimant's Chronic Pain Is Not Aggravated by Modified Job Duties

In S. Brobst v. WCAB (Schuylkill Products, Inc.) the WCJ rejected the Claimant's testimony he could not perform a light duty job on credibility grounds. The Claimant appealed citing Chavis v. W.C.A.B. (Port Authority of Allegheny County) 598 A.2d 97 (1991) for the proposition that the job was not available when he could not perform the job without chronic pain. The Court observed the credible medical testimony established only that the Claimant would have chronic pain with fatigue. The Court distinguished Chavis because in that case the duties of the job aggravated the Claimant's condition. The decision of the WCJ suspending benefits was affirmed.